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1. Some Initial Ontological Distinctions
In our discussion of Greg Landinis review, we should distinguish how the
logical systems HST  and HST  that I have developed are to be understood
in my reconstructions of Gottlob Freges and Bertrand Russells (1903) ontolo-
gies as opposed to how HST  is understood as a (proper) part of my ontology
of conceptual realism. Both of these systems are type-free second-order pred-
icate logics that allow predicate expressions (complex or simple) and formulas
(propositional forms) to be nominalized and occur in formulas as abstract sin-
gular terms.1
The main logical di¤erence berween these systems, as Landini notes, is that
whereas HST  contains standard rst-order logic (with identity) as a proper
part, the system HST  is free of existential presuppositions regarding singular
terms, including nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms, which is
essential to any argument for Russells paradox of predication. In particular,
nominalization of the Russell predicate that is not predicable of itself turns out
to be denotationless in HST  as an abstract singular term.
The main ontological di¤erence between Russells and Freges ontologies is
that one is intensional and the other is extensional. Russells (1903) ontology is
based on predication as the ontological nexus of propositions, whereas Freges
is based on predication as a function from properties and relations to truth
values.2 In conceptual realism, predication is based on the mutual saturation
of referential and predicable concepts as unsaturated complementary cognitive
structures, the result being a speech or mental act.3
In Russells ontology, a nominalized predicate denotes, as an abstract sin-
gular term, the very same property or relation (in-intension) that the predicate
stands for in its role as a predicate. In Freges ontology, a nominalized predicate
denotes the extension (value range,Wertverläufe) of the concept or relation (qua
1There is of course a type distinction between object terms and predicates in these systems;
but unlike the situation in type theory there is no hierarchy of predicates of di¤erent types.
2Freges Begri¤ e are really Eigenshaften, and in our in present context where we want to
distinguish concepts as cognitive capacities from Freges Begri¤ e, it is better to speak of his
Begri¤ e as properties instead.
3We assume in this discussion a distinction between predication in language, predication
in our speech and mental acts, and predication as the nexus of propositions or of states of
a¤airs, or, in Freges case, as functional application.
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function from objects to truth values) that the predicate stands for in predi-
cate position; and in conceptual realism, a nominalized predicate denotes the
intension of the concept (qua cognitive structure) that the predicate stands for
in its role as a predicate. Because what a predicate stands for and what its
nominalization denotes are not the same type of entity in either Freges ontol-
ogy or my conceptual realism, the fact that a nominalized predicate, on pain of
contradiction, might fail to denote as an abstract singular term does not a¤ect
the objective reality of what that predicate stands for in its role as a predicate.
That is why the system HST  can be used in a reconstruction of Freges ontol-
ogy as well as in my conceptual realism. The system HST  will also su¢ ce
for a reconstruction of Freges ontology, but a free rst-order predicate logic is
essential to my analysis of plurals and mass nouns in terms of the logic of classes
as many developed in my book, which means that only HST  is appropriate
for conceptual realism.
On the other hand, for a reconstruction of Russells ontology, where nomi-
nalized predicates denote the same property or relation they stand for in their
role as predicates, only the system HST  is appropriate. That is, because it is
the same entity involved in both roles in Russells ontology, we cannot in that
framework both a¢ rm the being of what a predicate stands for in its role as a
predicate, and also deny that being in the nominalization of the predicate as an
abstract singular term.
2. Russells Paradox of the Totality of Propositions
Landini claims that Russells paradox of the totality of propositions is a
paradox about hyper-intensionality. I disagree. There is nothing in Russells
discussion or argument for this paradox in Appendix B of the 1903 Princi-
ples of Mathematics that suggests that any hyper-intensionality principles are
involved or assumed in that argument. Indeed the logical context for that dis-
cussion and argument was Russells initial version of a simple theory of types
(sans any hyper-intensionality principle), which as I have shown is equivalent
to both HST and HST  . And then, from the time of Principia Mathematica
in 191013 and thereafter, Russell rejected propositions as real objective truths
or falsehood, which suggests that hyper-intensionality was also not involved in
Russells ramied theory of types.
But Landini is in good company. In 1974, Alonzo Church suggested mod-
ifying the type-theoretical language of simple type theory by adding a new
primitive sign for propositional identity along with certain new axioms that
amount to what others have come to call a hyper-intensional logic. Later, in
1984, Church showed how Russells paradox of the totality of propositions can
be resolved in this hyper-intensional logic. Since then others have tried to see
if they could construct new paradoxes using principles of hyper-intensionality.
Whatever one thinks of this later development, it is important that we separate
the original context of Russells 1903 ontology (or my conceptual realist ontol-
ogy) from the ontology of a later assumption of hyper-intensional principles,
type-theoretical or otherwise. It is clear that Churchs di¤erent resolution of
the paradox does not mean that my resolution is somehow defective. In other
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words, hyper-intensional principles in Churchs theory of types is one way of
resolving the paradox of the totality of propositions, but my way for the type-
free system HST  (and HST  ) shows that we do not need hyper-intensional
principles to solve the paradox.
My resolution of Russells paradox of propositions in the context of HST 
is correct, in other words, regardless whether or not we think that there might be
yet another paradox if we are inclined to add principles of hyper-intensionality
to HST . Certainly, as I have explained in my book, Serge Bozons argument
that there is a property-theoretic variant of this paradoxdoes not apply to
either Russells, Freges or my conceptual realist ontology as reconstructed by
HST  or HST  .
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Landini is not entirely pleased with certain aspects of my solution, however.
In particular, he objects to my way of representing the nominalization of a
propositional form (formula) ' as ['], which is read as that '(as in that
snow is white). Now according to clause 4 of the rules of my logical syntax
for HST  the expression ['] is generated as a 0-place predicate expression,
which as a predicate can be nominalized and treated as an abstract singular
term. That, of course, is the whole point of introducing such an expression.5
But, by clause 3, an n-place predicate applied to n terms results in a formula, for
all natural numbers n, including 0, from which it follows that ['] is a formula
as well.
Landini says that with 0-place predicate terms added to the language, a
predicate is permitted in the position of a formula anking a logical particle
such as the conjunction sign. This is true for propositional variables, which as 0-
place predicate variables are simple formulas (by clause 1 of my logical syntax);
and it is true for ['] as well. This may seem odd to some, because syntax
categories are usually exclusive of one another; but theres nothing inconsistent
about it.
Why have 0-place predicate expressions at all? Well, this goes back to the
work of Richard Montague in his development of a type-theoretical intensional
logic (sans principles of hyper-intensionality). Montague was my teacher and
mentor in this area, and I thought this was a nice simplifying way of looking at
propositional variables. But I have no objection to dropping the terminology
and that is all that is really involved here and simply call 0-place predicate
variables propositional variables instead.
As far as taking ['] as a 0-place predicate expression, and hence a formula
as well, even I nd this awkward and prefer simply writing ['] as an abstract
singular term (but only as such) instead. It is of course a trivial matter to
change the rules of the logical syntax for HST  to exclude ['] as well-formed
altogether, and just introduce ['] as an abstract singular term. In the end its
a matter of how natural one nds the syntax. I nd nothing substantive in this
4Bozon 2004, p.1.
5 In the denition of my logical syntax for HST  on page 96 of Cocchiarella 2008, I add
a footnote stipulating that if n = 0, then we are to take a1; :::; an as the empty sequence. It
is this stipulation that allows ['] to be a 0-place predicate expression by clause 4. We need
only require that n > 1 to exclude this possibility.
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issue.
3. Hyper-intensionality in Russells Early Ontology
Hyper-intensionality principles were designed by Church to reect a ner-
grained analysis of the structure of propositions which he assumed to be com-
plex abstract entities than could be represented by mere logical equivalence.
Although the proposition expressed by (P _ (Q^:Q)), for example, is logically
equivalent to (and therefore has the same truth conditions as) the proposition
expressed by P alone, nevertheless, according to Church, they do not express
the same proposition. The addition of hyper-intensional principles to simple
type theory was designed to capture the identity conditions of propositions as
complex abstract structures. And in his 1903 ontology, Russell was in fact
committed to propositions as complex abstract entities (but then after 1910 he
rejected propositions as abstract entities).
As noted in my book, what Russell meant (in 1903) by an ontological com-
plex was an object whose being presupposes the being of certain other terms
[objects].6 He recognized only two kinds of complexes at that time, namely,
classes as ones (sets), whose being presuppose the being of their members, and
propositions. Of course, classes as ones are extensional entities, and hyper-
intensionality principles do not apply to them. Nothing at all was said about
the complexity of properties and relations. Propositional functions were non-
entities in 1903, and later they became complex expressions that were associated
with properties and relations.
As independently real, abstract entities of Russells 1903 ontology, in other
words, some properties and relations are represented by complex predicate ex-
pressions (or what Russell called propositional functions); and that in fact is
exactly the function of the comprehension principle of HST , which is formal-
ized as:
(9F )(F = [x1:::xn']);
where the -abstract is homogeneously stratied (in the metalanguage). This
principle compares nicely with the rst-order formula (9x)(x = a) as a way
to indicate that the object expression a denotes (a value of the bound object
variables). But, just as the complexity of the object term a (as in the case
of denite descriptions or applied functors) does not indicate a corresponding
ontological complexity in what a denotes, so too the above comprehension prin-
ciple does not mean that the property or relation that the -abstract stands for
is an ontologically complex entity that has other properties and logical relations
as constituents. Rather, what it means is that there are logical relations that
hold between the properties and relations as represented by such a complex
expression and those represented by the constituent predicates that occur in
that expression. It is this view of properties and relations that is represented in
HST , as Landini notes, and not that of an ontology of complexes.
Now, the arguments for a paradox about hyper-intensionality depend on the
assumption that complex predicates represent complex properties and relations,
6Russell 1903, §133, p. 137.
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which is not true in Russells or Freges ontology, or in conceptual realism. But
even given such an assumption, there are problems with the hyper-intensional
principles assumed by Bozon. I will not repeat my criticism of these principles
here, however, and certainly Landinis discussion of this paradox should su¢ ce
to see what has gone wrong with Bozons argument. And, in regard to the
simpler version of the paradox formulated by Landini himself in his review, this
is resolved, as he says, by requiring that the -abstract [z'], where z does not
occur free in ', should be typed the same way as [']. I agree that this is the
appropriate step to take.
Landini makes a rather novel proposal regarding how to avoid assuming
hyper-intensional principles if we think that propositions are complex entities
to which some such principles should apply. His proposal is that we should drop
the nominalized propositional form ['] corresponding to each formula ', and
instead use a vacuously bound -abstract [z'], where z is not free in ', as a
1-place predicate expression. This is not a vacuousattribute if ' is true, it
should be noted, because in that case the predicate is true of everything. It is
vacuous, in other words, if, and only if, ' is false. The idea is that if nominalized
propositional forms are eliminated, then we need no longer worry about hyper-
intensionality, at least not in Russells early framework once propositions as
abstract entities are dropped from the ontology (as in fact Russell later did).
I do not think this proposal will work for conceptual realism, however. We
need a more perspicuous way to represent the cognitive structure of our speech
and mental acts in which a nominalized sentence will occur when we use a
predicate for an intentional verb such as know, believe, think, etc.. We also
need to develop a logic of these intentional verbs within the general framework
of conceptual realism, and in particular a logic that is based upon a ner-grained
analysis of the structure of nominalized sentences than I have given so far.
Of course, if a logic of intentional verbs can be developed on the basis of
Landinis proposal, that might be a preferable way to go. In that regard I have
no real objection to that approach and wish success in constructing such a logic
to Landini and others who prefer his option instead.
4. Hyper-intensionality in Conceptual Realism
Predicable concepts in conceptual realism are unsaturated cognitive capaci-
ties that underlie our rule-following abilities in the use of predicate expressions;
and as such they determine the correct use and therefore truth conditions of
those predicates in di¤erent contexts of use. As a cognitive capacity, the con-
cept that a complex predicate expression stands for is not itself a complex of the
concepts and logical relations that the component parts of that expression stand
for. That is why hyper-intensionality principles do not apply to the predicate
expressions of conceptual realism in their role as predicates, and in particular to
those that are used in our speech and mental acts. In this regard, Landini is cor-
rect in noting that I reject hyper-intensional principles as applied to referential
and predicable concepts.
Intensional objects, as the objectied contents of concepts do not have an
unsaturated nature, on the other hand, and as I suggested in my book, we might
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very well want to view them as complexly structured objects subject to some
hyper-intensional principles. The problem is how are these complexly structured
objects to be semantically characterized and what hyper-intensional principles
do they validate.
One approach might be to rst semantically distinguish the quasi-intensions
of expressions, i.e., the functions from contexts of use to extensions of the rele-
vant sort, that are determined by our concepts as cognitive capacities.7 Then,
assuming quasi-intensions, we go on to distinguish the intensions of those ex-
pressions in a stricter sense, and in particular a sense that represents their
ne-grained structure as well as the quasi-intensions of their component parts.8
The question is: how are we to semantically characterize these intensions in a
stricter sense?
One proposal might be to identify the intensional object denoted by a nomi-
nalized sentence (or complex predicate expression) with a well-ordered sequence
of the quasi-intensions denoted by the component parts of that sentence (includ-
ing that of the sentence, or complex predicate, itself), i.e., a sequence ordered
in accordance with the way that the sentence (or complex predicate) is induc-
tively constructed. Of course all of the predicate and referential expressions
occurring in a nominalized sentence, or in a nominalized complex predicate, are
understood to be deactivated.
Some hyper-intensional principles will be validated under such an analysis.
The sequence denoted by a nominalized conjunction (' ^  ), for example, will
be di¤erent from the sequence denoted by the nominalization of the logically
equivalent sentence ( ^'), so that the two nominalizations will denote di¤erent
intensional objects. In this way the hyper-intensional thesis:
[P1 ^Q1] = [P2 ^ P3]! P1 = P2 ^Q1 = Q2;
will be validated. Of course, there will be similar theses validated for disjunc-
tion, conditionals and biconditionals; and then there will be still other such
theses as well. Determination of which hyper-intensional principles are valid
and whether a consistent set of such principles can be added to HST  or
HST  , and whether a completeness theorem could then be proven for these
principles are issues that must be left to future research.
One might object to this proposal as being an unnatural view of the strict
intensional content of a sentence; but I suspect that such an objection assumes
that such propositional content is somehow present before the mindin such a
way that the structure of that content is part of the presentation. Neverthe-
less, even granting that, it might very well be that having such a presentation
before the mind involves a comprehension of the inductive steps involved in the
construction of that content.
7Quasi-intensions, as functions from contexts of use (or possible worlds), are what are
usually called intensions in modal logic. The quasi-intension of an n-ary predicate, e.g., is a
function from possible contexts of use to classes of n-tuples in the domains of those contexts.
The quasi-intension of a sentence is the function from contexts of use to the truth values,
truth or falsehood.
8 Intensions in a stricter sense are usually called senses.
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How well this proposal can be consistently carried out is, as I have said, a
project for future research. There might of course be other ways to interpret
intensional objects so that the structure of a formula (or complex predicate) will
be a determinant in how intensional objects are individuated. The main point
to note here is that hyper-intensional principles can be applied in conceptual
realism, but only to intensional objects and not at all to referential and predi-
cable concepts, and therefore not at all to referential and predicate expressions
in their primary roles.
5. Freges Hierarchy of Levels of Concepts
Landini suggests a di¤erent approach to representing complex intensional
objects, and in particular one that does not assume any hyper-intensional prin-
ciples. Landini would utilize Freges higher levels of concepts instead, but with
concepts understood as in conceptual realism (i.e., as cognitive structures) as
opposed to Freges own view of concepts as abstract functions.
Actually, in his review, Landini deals only with the rst three levels of Freges
hierarchy: namely, the initial level of objects, the rst-level concepts, and the
second-level of referential-quantier concepts. (I am not sure how going any
higher is relevant to Landinis proposal.) What Landini describes is an extension
of HST  (and HST  as well I assume) in which quantiable variables for the
(unsaturated) quantier phrases of Freges second level are added.
I described such an extension of these systems in a 1992 paper and noted
that (in the monadic case)
(8Q)(9F )(F = [y(9G)(y = G ^ (Qx)G(x))])
is an instance of the comprehension principle of this extension of HST .9 I
then noted that Freges double-correlation thesis follows; that is,
(8Q)(9F )(8y)(F (y)$ (9G)[y = G ^ (Qx)G(x)])
is then provable. What this thesis says is that for every second-level (referential-
quantier) concept Q, there is a rst-level concept F such that all and only the
concepts that fall within Q fall under F . The provability of this thesis," in
such an extension or otherwise, I then noted, indicates the superuousness
of extending the system HST  through the addition of quantiable variables
for variable-binding operators, i.e., for variables that range over second-level
concepts.10 The question here is: given the double-correlation thesis do we
really need to extend these systems in the way that Landini proposes; that is,
is such an extension not superuous after all?
The example Landini considers is the sentence S believes that the author of
Waverly is brilliant. As a speech act by someone (other than S) this sentence
is initially symbolized in my framework as
S Believes [(91xW )Brilliant(x)];
9Cocchiarella 1992.
10 Ibid., p. 189f.
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where (91xW ) is read as the author of Waverly, and where the symbolization
of the sentence The author of Waverly is brillianthas been nominalized (and
placed in brackets to indicate this).11
First, let us note that as a speech act this sentence might have either a de
re reading or a de dicto reading. Landini considers only the de re reading,
apparently because this is the one that on his account shows how to avoid the
paradoxes he discusses. Then, following the standard (rst-order) pattern for
a de re analysis regarding the referential expression in the sentence said to be
believed, Landini suggests that we should move up a level and quantify over
that referential expression outside of the context of the nominalized sentence.
Thus, the de re analysis he gives us is essentially the following12 :
(9Q)(8G)([Q(G)$ (91xW )G(x)] ^ S believes Q(Brilliant)):
Note that Landini uses a third-level predicate Q (a la Russells hierarchy)
instead of a variable-binding operator Q of Freges hierarchy of unsaturated
higher-level concepts (as explained in section 3 of his review). Changing this to
an operator gives us the following instead (which I will assume is what Landini
really wants):
(9Q)(8G)([(Qx)G(x)$ (91xW )G(x)] ^ S believes (Qx)Brilliant(x)): (1)
Now the more natural way of representing the de re analysis of this sentence
is simply to bring the referential expression up front as follows:
(91xW )[S believes Brillisant(x)]; (2)
which can be read as S believes of the author of Waverly that he is brilliant.
Note that if we assume the extended framework I described in my 1992 paper,
we can then obtain
(9Q)(8G)([(Qx)G(x) = [91xW )G(x)] ^ S believes (Qx)Brilliant(x)]; (3)
which is equivalent to (2), and which implies the weaker version (1) above.
Formulas (2) and (3), in other words, say essentially the same thing, and (3)
implies Landinis (1). Here we have a clear example of how going to a higher-
level is superuous.
6. Orilias Contingent Paradox
11 In my framework all referential phrases are quantier phrases, including phrases based on
the determiner the. The relevant rule for 91 is the following schema:
(91xA=F (x))G(x)$ (9xA)[(8yA)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x)];
I have included the relative clause F (x) here as well for the general case. The quantier phrase
(91xA=F (x)) is read as the A that is F, and the formula on the left of the biconditional is
read as the A that is F is G. The right-hand sign says that there is exactly one A that is F
and it is G.
12Landini has [H (91xW )H(x)](G) instead of (91xW )G(x), but the two expressions are
equivalent by -conversion, and the latter is simpler and easier to read.
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Francesco Orilias contingent paradox starts with specication of a property
P dened as follows:
P = [x(9F )(x = F ^ (8y)[S thinkst about y ! :F (y)])]:
Orilias contingent assumption is that S thinks about an object y at time t if
and only if y is P :
(8y)(S thinkst about y $ y = P ):
From this contingent assumption and the denition of P , a contradiction is said
to follow, namely, P (P ) ! :P (P ).13
Now this argument may seem familiar to philosophers used to dealing with
arguments about propositional attitudes. A familiar example is when the person
S is thinking at time t about Cicero. I am not at all sure what is going on in Ss
mind when he thinks about Cicero and only Cicero, but according to Landini
we can direct our minds, by employing denite descriptions, to secure reference
to a unique object.14 I nd this problematic: can one really secure reference"
to Santa Clause by thinking about Santa Clause whatever denite description
one uses? Well, perhaps what Landini means is that we purport to secure
reference to Santa Clause by means of a denite description. In any case well
let this pass and assume that if S thinks at time t about Cicero, then he has
a certain denite description in mind, e.g., the Roman senator who denounced
Cataline.
But now, although Cicero is Tully, it turns out S does not know this. Yet, it
is true that S is thinking at time t about an object y if, and only if y is identical
with Cicero, i.e., if, and only if, y is identical with Tully, the Roman senator
who denounced Cataline. This is true because the occurrence of Ciceroon the
right-hand side of the biconditional is referentially transparent, which means
that we can replace Cicerowith the co-referential name Tullyor the denite
description the Roman senator who denounced Cataline.
Now it is clear that we cannot validly conclude that S is thinking at time t
about Tully at least not if we want to respect the kind of referential opacity
that the variable y has in its occurrence within the scope of the propositional
attitude thinking-about.15 In other words, because such a context is not refer-
entially transparent, there are restrictions on the use of Leibnizs law when re-
placing referential expressions that occur within it by co-referential expressions.
There are also, I should add, restrictions on the use of universal instantiation
into propositional attitude contexts, just as there are such restrictions in modal
13Orilia 1996.
14This view goes back to Russell who wrote that the names that we commonly use, like
Socrates, are really abbreviations for descriptions. (Russell 1918, p. 200.)
15We might note here that think about is actually doubly opaque, rst for think and
secondly for about. The intensional preposition can be applied to a number of intensional
verbs, such as in talk about, know about, wonder about, etc. The doubly opaque aspect
was noted and analyzed by Richard Montague in the type-theoretical intensional logic of his
paper, The proper treatment of quantication in ordinary English, reprinted in Montague
1974.
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logic. It would be wrong to ignore these restrictions and conclude that S is both
thinking about Tully and not thinking about Tully at time t; and it would be
inappropriate to claim on the basis of this error that something is wrong, indeed
paradoxical, about standard rst-order logic with identity.
Applying this familiar way to understand propositional attitude contexts to
Orilias contingent paradox, let us suppose now that what S is thinking about
at time t is the property his colleague discussed with him a week before, and
that as a matter of fact that property is P . Accordingly, Orilias contingent
assumption is true, i.e., S is thinking at time t about an object y if, and only
if, y = P .
But, although S is thinking at time t about the property his colleague dis-
cussed with him a week ago, and this property in fact is P , it does not follow
that one can validly instantiate the universal quantier (8y) of the contingent
assumption toP , and conclude that S is thinking at time t about P , because
in fact what he is thinking about is the property his colleague discussed with
him a week ago. Indeed, he may no longer remember the specic structure his
colleague had talked about, or he may not even have learned the details of that
structure. But even if he did learn and does remember that structure, some-
thing more needs to be specied before the universal instantiation in question
can be allowed as valid. That is because one of the occurrences of y within the
contingent assumption is not referentially transparent, i.e., it does not occur in
a strictly extensional context.
Nor similarly can one then go on to instantiate the universal quantier (8y)
in the denition of P to P , because, as with the contingent assumption, there
are restrictions about such a universal instantiation into the context of a propo-
sitional attitude. Again, one of the occurrences of y is not referentially trans-
parent; and something more is needed for the universal instantiation to be valid.
Perhaps, in analogy with using Leibnizs law in epistemic contexts, where
knowing who A is allows us to treat A as rigidin the knowers epistemic space
(the possible worlds compatible with what S knows), i.e., where S knows who
A isis symbolized as: (9y)S knows [y = A], what is needed is something like
there being an object y such that S thinks at time t that y = P ; that is, perhaps
the something more that is needed is the following:
(9y)S thinkst [y = P ]:
Perhaps this would su¢ ce to stipulate that P is somehow rigidin Ss think-
ing space (whatever that is), so as to indicate that he has learned and hasnt
forgotten the involuted details of its specication. But then again, perhaps it
does not su¢ ce to account for the something more that is needed.
We do not know without further investigation if this added assumption does
su¢ ce for the propositional attitude thinkst, but in any case we are now in a
situation where S is thinking at t about more than exactly one thing; that is,
he is thinking at time t about the property his colleague discussed with him a
week ago, and that some object y is such that he thinks at time t that y is P
(whatever that might mean as a mental act).
10
The same di¢ culty applies to Landinis version of the Liar paradox, but I
will not into the details here.16 The point to keep in mind is that the logic
of propositional attitudes, like that of necessity and possibility, requires special
constraints on the use of Leibnizs law for identity and for universal instanti-
ation (or existential generalization) and it requires a semantico-philosophical
account of those restrictions as well. What is needed, in other words, is a de-
velopment of a consistent logic of the expressions for propositional attitudes.
That development was not given my book, but was left as a project for future
research that I hope both Landini and Orilia, as well as others, will take up in
the future.
In any case, as with the so-called paradox of S thinking about Tully and not
thinking about Tully, where it would be inappropriate to conclude on the basis
of that argument that something is wrong with rst-order logic, it would also
be inappropriate to conclude on the basis of Orilias contingent paradox that
something is wrong, indeed paradoxical, about the system HST  or HST  , or
with my general framework of conceptual realism.
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